The Value of Humanity: Reflections on Korsgaard's Transcendental Argument by Stern, R.
promoting access to White Rose research papers 
   










This is an author produced version of a paper subsequently published as a book 
chapter in Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism. 
 
 







Stern, R. (2011) The Value of Humanity: Reflections on Korsgaard's 
Transcendental Argument In; Smith, J., Sullivan, P. (ed.) Transcendental 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































                                                                                                                                                                                                   
agents, which is to distort the nature of genuine moral action which should not be grounded in 
anything outside morality itself. I discuss this issue further in (Stern 2010). 
37 I gave a first version of this paper at one of the Transcendental Philosophy and Naturalism workshops, 
under the AHRC funded project run by Mark Sacks. Mark offered very useful and characteristically 
generous comments on that occasion, the last on which I was to see him. I am therefore particularly 
grateful to Joel Smith and Peter Sullivan for undertaking the publication of this paper, as what is very 
sadly the last chapter in the discussion that Mark and I had on matters transcendental over many 
years, from which I learned so much. 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